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The announcement of European Union enlargement coincided with ad r a m a t i cr i s ei ns t o c kp r i c e s
in accession countries. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the rise in stock prices was a
result of the repricing of systematic risk due to the integration of accession countries into the world
market. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm-level stock price changes are positively related to the diﬀerence between
a ﬁrm’s local and world market betas. This result is robust to controlling for changes in expected
earnings, country eﬀects and other controls, although the magnitude of the eﬀect is not very large.
The diﬀerences between local and world betas explain nearly 22% of the stock price increase.
JEL Codes: F36, G15, G12
Key Words: asset pricing, international ﬁnancial integration, EU enlargement
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Economists expect that capital market integration leads to a lower cost of capital. The lower cost 
of capital is in part a result of greater risk sharing in integrated markets. Greater risk sharing is 
only one channel through which firms benefit from integration, but it is one that is frequently 
emphasized in theoretical literature on capital market integration. This paper asks whether risk 
sharing capacity was correctly priced in the eight Eastern European countries following the 
announcement of EU enlargement. This is important for evaluating the benefits of capital market 
integration because firms will face a lower cost of capital only if their risk sharing capacity is 
correctly priced.     
 
When an equity market is segmented from the rest of the world, local investors hold only local 
firms and local firms are held only by local investors. In this case, the risk of each firm depends 
on how much its returns move with the local market portfolio. In contrast, in an integrated 
market firms are held by global investors and the risk of each firm depends on how much its 
returns move with the world portfolio. Firm returns tend to move much more with the local 
market than with the world market. Therefore, firms tend to be less risky in an integrated market 
than in a segmented market. The reduction in a firm’s risk depends on the difference between 
how much its returns move with the local versus world portfolio. When firms become less risky, 
their value goes up and the cost of capital goes down. Therefore, when markets become 
integrated, the vast majority of firms should experience an increase in price. Moreover, the 
increase in price should be correlated with firm-specific changes in risk.  
 
We argue that following the November 2001 announcement of EU enlargement, the equity 
markets in accession countries gradually switched from segmented to integrated. We note that 
the announcement coincided with a dramatic rise in stock prices in the accession countries - an 
observation that is consistent with markets correctly pricing the reduction in risk in an integrated 
market. In addition, we test whether firm-specific price changes after the announcement are 
related to firm-specific changes in risk. Here we find mixed evidence. Only one of our two 
measures of firm-specific changes in risk is significantly related to firm-specific price changes. 
While not overwhelming, this evidence lends support to capital market integration efforts. It 
shows that the change in risk following market integration is priced by investors. Therefore, 
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The announcement of European Union (EU) enlargement coincided with the beginning of a dramatic
rise in stock prices in candidate countries. Between November 2001, when the European Commission
outlined the timing and named countries involved in the enlargement, and July 2004, stock prices
in the eight Central and Eastern European candidate countries increased on average by over 90%
in dollar terms.1 In comparison, the world market index returned about 8% during the same time
period. This paper investigates whether the rise in stock prices in the accession countries was a
result of repricing of systematic risk due to the integration of local stock markets into the world
market. In a segmented market, the source of systematic risk of each ﬁrm is the covariance of its
returns with the local market. By contrast, in an integrated market, the source of systematic risk is
the covariance of a ﬁrm’s returns with the world market. The covariance of individual ﬁrm returns
with the world market is likely to be smaller than the covariance with a local market. Thus, a move
from a segmented to an integrated market should lead to a fall in systematic risk and to a permanent
price increase.
It is possible that a credible announcement of EU enlargement led to an integration of the
previously segmented Central and Eastern European stock markets with the rest of the world.
Although foreign investors were allowed to invest in the accession countries for some time prior
to the enlargement announcement, some foreigners may have refrained from investing in legally
open markets because of real or perceived political, liquidity, and corporate governance risks. Clear
prospects for EU accession may have alleviated these risks and increased the integration of local
markets with the world market. Such integration would have led to a fall in systematic risk and a
rise in stock prices.
Repricing of systematic risk following market integration was tested on stock market liberaliza-
tions in Asia and Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the aggregate level, Henry
(2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) ﬁnd that market integration leads to a permanent increase in
the stock market index. This ﬁnding is consistent with shares being priced according to the market’s
covariance with world returns rather than according to the much larger variance of local market re-
turns. Using ﬁrm level data, Errunza and Miller (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁrms which oﬀer ADRs experience
abnormal returns following the ADR announcement and that these returns are related to the diver-
1The average return in terms of local currency was 65%. The eight Central and Eastern European accession
countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Figure 1
shows the stock price developments.
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integration at the ﬁrm level. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms that experience larger changes in systematic risk
upon integration also experience larger repricing. The change in systematic risk explains about 40%
of the stock price increases upon integration. Our paper follows a similar strategy. It uses ﬁrm
level data to calculate the changes in systematic risk for each ﬁrm, and examines whether changes
in systematic risk are proportional to stock price changes while controlling for other simultaneous
events, mainly the changes in expected future earnings. As a control group we include three Eastern
European countries that were not part of the ﬁrst wave of EU enlargement. If EU enlargement is
responsible for the integration, repricing should occur only in the eight countries included in the
enlargement.
Understanding whether repricing of systematic risk took place in the EU accession countries is
important for at least three reasons. First, it allows us to evaluate the beneﬁts of EU integration.
Integrated capital markets should deliver a lower cost of capital leading to higher investment and
growth. The lower cost of capital should come from the reduction in the risk free interest rate as
well as the reduction in systematic risk. The reduction in systematic risk will beneﬁt ﬁrms only
if this risk is correctly priced by the market. If it is, then the beneﬁts of EU integration extend
beyond access to larger markets. In this sense, this paper complements a growing literature on
stock market integration in the original 15 EU members (for a comprehensive survey see chapter
8 in Baele et. al. (2004)). Second, ﬁnding out whether changes in systematic risk are priced by
the market is important beyond the context of the EU enlargement. Greater risk sharing is one of
the frequently emphasized beneﬁts of open capital markets (see, for example, Stulz (1999)). It is
worthwhile to investigate whether risk sharing is actually priced by the market. In a similar vain,
capital market integrations also provide a unique opportunity to test the asset pricing models in
diﬀerences rather than in levels. This argument is forcefully made by Chari and Henry (2004) who
argue that liberalizations are natural experiments which deliver power to detect cross the sectional
relationship implied by the asset pricing model. EU enlargement is another such natural experiment
where there is a large, arguably exogenous, change in the source of ﬁrms’ systematic risk.
Many existing papers point out that capital market liberalizations are often associated with other
events which may lead to higher expected proﬁts.2 This makes it diﬃcult to separate the repricing
eﬀect from the eﬀect of an increase in the expected growth rate of dividends. This is also an issue
2See Errunza and Miller (2000) p.579, Chari and Henry (2004) pp. 1298 and 1317 , Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine
(2002) p. 206, Henry (2000) p. 540, and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) p. 575.
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and Eastern European ﬁrms and increased assistance from the EU budget which could have led to
greater consumer conﬁdence following the prospects of EU membership. The adoption of EU laws
and standards may result in improved corporate governance. We control for the changes in expected
growth of dividends by using changes in analysts’ earnings estimates. We use data from the IBES
on expected earnings as of the time of the announcement of EU enlargement. This is in contrast to
both Errunza and Miller (2000) and Chari and Henry (2004) who attempt to control for an increase
in the expected dividend growth by using changes in actual, rather than expected, earnings and
dividends.
Dating market integration is notoriously diﬃcult (see Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) for
a survey of methods). As already mentioned, integration depends not only on legal restrictions, but
also on investors’ willingness to participate in opened markets. We hypothesize that the integration
increased in the months following the 2001 announcement of EU enlargement. Since an increase in
integration should be associated with a price increase, the post-2001 rise in aggregate stock prices
shown in Figure 1 and mentioned earlier is consistent with integration. If integration occurred
earlier, we should see a sharp price increase prior to 2001. However, with the exception of Poland,
the post-2001 boom in prices is unprecedented. Section 3 provides some additional evidence that
foreign investors seriously considered the Central and Eastern European markets only once it became
clear that these countries would become part of the EU. Since we can never be fully conﬁdent of
the integration date, it is possible to view our analysis as a test of joint hypothesis that integration
occurred in the months after the 2001 announcement and that markets price stocks according to
their systematic risk.
In summary, this paper contributes to the existing literature by examining whether Chari and
Henry’s intriguing ﬁndings hold in a diﬀerent setting – an increase in actual integration rather than
removal of legal restrictions – and for a diﬀerent set of countries. Ours is also the ﬁrst paper which
explicitly controls for changes in expected earnings when looking at the eﬀects of capital market
liberalization. Finally, this paper begins to address the eﬀects of EU enlargement on stock markets
in the accession countries. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the theory behind changes in asset prices as a result of market integration. Section 3 makes the case
that integration increased at the time of the fall 2001 announcement of EU enlargement. Sections 4
and 5 present the data and empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
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According to fundamental stock valuation, today’s price of a stock equals the present discounted
value of the future stream of dividends paid to the owners of the stock (Gordon (1962)). The
present value depends on what the stream of dividends is, and on the rate at which these dividends
are discounted. This means that the price of a stock could change when either the expected stream
of dividends changes (the numerator), or when the discount rate changes (the denominator). One
of the goals of this paper is to examine to what extent is the sharp price increase at the time of the
EU enlargement announcement related to changes in expected future dividends and to changes in
the discount rate.
The rate at which future dividends are discounted is the required rate of return for holding a
stock. The required rate of return is the risk-free interest rate plus the stock’s risk premium. The
stock’s risk premium is proportional to the market risk premium with the index of proportionality
being the stock’s beta. Beta measures the stock’s contribution to the variance of the market portfolio.
If a market is segmented from the rest of the word, the relevant market portfolio is the local market.
Hence, under segmentation, the required rate of return on a stock is:
ki = rf + βi,MλM, (1)
where rf is the risk free return in the segmented market, βi,M is the stock’s local market beta
calculated as the covariance of the stock’s return with the local market return divided by the variance
of the local market’s return, βi,M =
cov(Ri,RM)
var(RM) ,a n dλM, is the local market premium.
If a market is fully integrated with the rest of the world, the relevant market portfolio is the
world market and the required rate of return for a stock is:
k∗
i = r∗
f + βi,WλW, (2)
where r∗
f is the risk free return in the integrated market, βi,W is the stock’s world market beta
calculated as the covariance of the stock’s return with the world market return divided by the
variance of the world market’s return, βi,W =
cov(Ri,RW )
var(RW ) ,a n dλW is the world market premium.
2.1 Market premium is proportional to the variance of market returns
When investors maximize the expected utility of their wealth, the market premium equals the
product of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the variance of market returns. Thus, in a
segmented market, the premium is proportional to the variance of the local market return, λM =
9
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hold the world portfolio, and hence, market premium is proportional to the variance of the world
portfolio, λW = γvar(RW). In our sample of countries, the average sample variance of local market
returns is nearly 9 times the sample variance of world returns. This means that in theory, the market
premium should fall substantially upon integration. We also assume that the coeﬃcients of relative
risk aversion of an average local and world investor are the same.3
Subtracting equation (1) from equation (2) and using the deﬁnitions of betas and lambdas:
k
∗
i − ki =( r
∗
f − rf) − γDIFCOVi, (3)
where DIFCOVi =[ cov(Ri,R M)−cov(Ri,R W)]. Equation (3) says that the change in the required
rate of return following market integration depends on two terms: the change in the risk free interest
rate, and the diﬀerence between the covariance of the stock’s return with the local market and the
covariance of the stock’s return with the world market. This is the speciﬁcation derived by Chari
and Henry (2004). The eﬀect of the ﬁrst term is straightforward: the lower the risk free interest
rate under integration, the lower the required return on all stocks. Note that this eﬀect does not
vary across stocks. The second term in equation (3) measures the change in systematic risk. In a
segmented market, the source of systematic risk is the covariance with the local market, while in an
integrated market, the source of systematic risk is the covariance with the world market. A stock
that moves less with the world market than with the local market has a lower systematic risk in an
integrated market than in a segmented market. Lower systematic risk means a lower required rate
of return. This in turn means that future dividends are discounted at a lower rate, and the price of
a stock goes up. Thus, ﬁrms that have a high covariance with the local market but a low covariance
with the world market should experience a large price increase upon integration.
2.2 Market premium is constant
In deriving DIFCOV we assumed that the market premium is proportional to the variance of market
returns. This is theoretically appealing because it is implied by utility maximization. However,
when we estimate DIFCOV using historical data, we implicitly assume that the market premium is
proportional to the sample variance of market returns. The ratio of the sample variance of local to
3If global investors were less risk averse than investors in Central and Eastern Europe, market integration would
have led to an increase in stock prices in accession countries regardless of return covariances. However, as Chari and
Henry (2004), who also assume that the coeﬃcients of risk aversion of world and local investors are the same, we do
not seek to explain the price increase using diﬀerences in risk aversion.
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upon integration. While it is reasonable for the market premium to drop, a drop of this magnitude
seems implausibly high. The historical time series in accession countries may be too short to make
a reliable inference about the value of the market premium. There is also a good deal of literature
on the equity premium puzzle (see Siegler and Thaler (1997), Clauss and Thomas (2001) or Fama
and French (2002)) which points out that the observed market premium and the standard deviation
of market returns are inconsistent with reasonable values of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
Given this uncertainty about the value of the market premium and its relationship to the variance
of market returns, it may be worthwhile not to rely on on the assumption that the premium is
proportional to the variance of market returns. As an alternative we assume that the market
premium is the same across countries and does not change upon integration, thus λW = λM = λ.
In this case, the diﬀerence in the required rate of return is:
k∗
i − ki =( r∗
f − rf) − λDIFBETAi, (4)
where DIFBETAi = βi,M − βi,W. Equation (4) says that the change in the required rate of return
following market integration depends again on the change in the risk free rate and the diﬀerence
between the local and world betas. Firms that have low world market betas relative to their local
market betas should experience higher price increase than ﬁrms with relatively high world market
betas. The intuition is the same as with the diﬀerence in covariances: ﬁrms that move relatively
little with the world market provide more diversiﬁcation to a global investor and hence should have
a higher price upon integration.
We view DIFBETA as an alternative measure of the change in systematic risk. The disadvan-
tage of DIFBETA is that unlike DIFCOV , it does not take into account possible changes in the
market premium upon integration. The advantage of using DIFBETA is that we no longer need to
estimate the market premium using the sample variance of market returns. Assuming that market
premium does not change is also consistent with practitioners using a “rule of thumb” estimate for
market premium. For example, Welch (2000) surveys over 200 ﬁnancial economists about their esti-
mate of the market premium. The consensus estimate is about 7%. A commonly used estimate of the
market premium in the U.S. is about 8%, as published by Ibbotson Associates. In practice, investors
calculate the appropriate discount rate, ki, by adding the risk free rate to the product of a stock’s
beta and some market premium. Investment services such as Value Line or Merrill Lynch’s Security
Risk Evaluation routinely publish betas, expecting investors to plug in their own “rule of thumb”
11
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useful measures of the changes in systematic risk. While DIFCOV is theoretically more appealing,
DIFBETA recognizes the diﬃculty of estimating the market premium and emphasizes the use of
beta by practitioners as a measure of systematic risk.
Stock prices can also increase if the expected stream of dividends increases. It is quite possi-
ble that the EU enlargement gave investors reasons to expect higher future dividends. Therefore,
in addition to DIFCOV and DIFBETA, we include changes in expected earnings as possible
explanations for the dramatic rise in stock prices following the announcement of EU enlargement.
3D a t i n g i n t e g r a t i o n
In order to test whether repricing of systematic risk has taken place, market integration needs to be
dated. Dating market integration is problematic. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) provide a
survey of the variety of approaches which have been used. These range from a parameterized model
of integration and segmentation by Bekaert and Harvey (1995), to identifying structural breaks in
foreign capital ﬂows in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), or in returns and dividend yields as in Bekaert,
Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002), to examining changes in legal framework as in Kim and Singal (2000)
or Henry (2000).4 Integration means that the marginal investor, whether local or foreign, considers
local assets as part of the world portfolio. The diﬃculty of dating integration comes from two facts.
The ﬁrst is that the removal of legal restrictions on foreign investment does not automatically lead to
integration. When legal restrictions are not binding in the ﬁrst place, investors may not respond to
their removal. For example, foreigners may refrain from investing in a legally open market because of
political, liquidity, and corporate governance risks. Also, local investors may not have the expertise
or resources to diversify abroad, even if it is perfectly legal to do so. The second problem is that to
a large extent, integration is a gradual process. Restrictions on foreign transactions are often lifted
gradually. In addition, the perceptions of foreign and local investors are likely to change slowly.
Thus, identifying the exact day or month when markets switch from segmentation to integration is
virtually impossible.
Table I shows a number of dates pertaining to stock market liberalization in the eight countries.
The second column shows that stock markets were established between 1988 (Slovenia) and 1996
4Henry (2000) uses three approaches. The ﬁrst is the issuance of a decree by the government allowing foreign
investment. The second is the establishment of a country fund traded in the U.S. market. The third is an increase in
the number of ﬁrms deemed investible by the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
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and 1999. However, it is important to point out that the legal restrictions on foreign participation
were lifted only gradually as indicated in the numerous footnotes in the table. The fourth column
shows when the Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), the most commonly used source of emerging
stock market data, began covering each market. The range of dates is from 1992 for Poland and
Hungary to 1997 for Latvia. The ﬁrst country to issue an ADR was Hungary in 1992, and the
last were Lithuania and Latvia in 1997. In summary, it appears that to a large extent foreign
participation was legal well before the 2001 announcement of EU enlargement. Actual foreign
interest as manifested in the EMBD coverage and ADR activity is also apparent before 2001.
EU enlargement involved elimination of all restrictions on movement of capital. In EU law,
movement of capital is covered by article 56 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(EurLex (2002)). According to the article, any restrictions on movement of capital between two
member states, or between a member state and a third country, are prohibited. For new members
this provision is covered in chapter 4 of the enlargement negotiations (European Commission (2004)).
All eight countries closed the negotiations of this chapter in December 2002.5 The coverage of
chapter 4 is extensive and includes ownership of assets and liabilities, payment systems, settlement
and money laundering. It is clear that by December 2002 all eight countries were free of restrictions
on the movement of capital.6 In addition, it is possible that EU enlargement changed the perception
of investors. EU enlargement is an irreversible event that could persuade global investors to include
accession countries into their portfolios.
The intention of the eight countries to join the European Union was made public soon after the
fall of communism in 1989 and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, there has always
been considerable uncertainty as to which countries would be allowed to join and when. Formal
negotiations did not begin until 1998. The Treaty of Nice, which outlines the enlargement, was
signed in 2000. The treaty was subsequently rejected in an Irish referendum in 2001 - a serious
setback to the enlargement process. A second Irish referendum in 2002 accepted the treaty. The
European Commission provided annual progress reports on enlargement, the most signiﬁcant of
which was published in November 2001. The report was signiﬁcant not only because it listed the
countries included in the ﬁrst wave of enlargement, but also because it provided a timetable for
5The negotiations of this chapter began in the fall of 1999 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and
Estonia. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia began negotiations in the fall of 2000.
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stock prices in the accession countries. The fact that EU enlargement was becoming a reality
was reﬂected in media coverage. The earliest match to EU enlargement in the New York Times
archive is a November 2001 article detailing the EU commission report (Green (2001)). Therefore,
in the baseline speciﬁcation we consider November 2001 as the beginning of the window in which the
integration occurred. The length of the integration window in the baseline speciﬁcation is 16 months
which is set to capture the gradual nature of the integration. Chari and Henry use one and two
months windows. In other stock market integration studies Henry (2000) and Christoﬀersen, Chung
and Errunza (2002) use an 8 month window, Errunza and Miller (2000) use a 6 month window.
4D a t a
We use two sets of data: one on returns and one on changes in expected earnings. The return
data includes ﬁrm-level stock returns in accession countries, returns on aggregate market indices in
accession countries, and returns on a world market index. The data on ﬁrm-level returns comes from
the Emerging Markets Database (EMDB) which is maintained by Standard & Poor’s. The EMDB
has monthly data on large and active ﬁrms in all eight accession countries. In addition, we collect
data on Russia, Romania and Croatia to use as a control group.7 The ﬁrm-level returns include
dividends.8 For returns on the aggregate local market indices we use the log diﬀerence of the S&P
global total return indices which are a part of the EMDB. For returns on the world market we use
the log diﬀerence of the MSCI world equity index.
All returns and price changes are calculated in current U.S. dollars using current exchange rates.
This amounts to assuming that the global investor is an American, or that relative PPP holds.
If relative PPP holds, it does not matter in which currency we calculate returns because the real
returns will be the same for an investor living anywhere.However, it is true that relative PPP does
not hold, especially in the short run. Indeed, during the period we study, the currencies in the
eight accession countries mostly appreciated and these appreciations were real, i.e. relative PPP did
not hold. In deciding whether to calculate returns in local currencies, Euros or dollars, we decided
to follow Chari and Henry (2004) and many others and calculated all returns in dollars. We are
7Of the other Eastern European countries EMDB also covers the Ukraine and Bulgaria. However, the two countries
had no ﬁrms long enough to meet the minimum data requirements described below.
8We calculated total (dividend inclusive) returns as the log diﬀerence of the total return index. The total return
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dollars.
The covariances and betas of ﬁrm, local and world returns are calculated using three years of
historical data. Choosing three years of historical data tries to strike a balance between having
enough time series observations to estimate covariances with some precision, and measuring the
most recent pattern of co-movement.9 The change in stock prices is calculated over the integration
window from November 2001 to February 2003. These minimum data requirements mean that for a
ﬁrm to be included in the analysis, the data must go back to at least October 1999 and be in the data
set at least until February 2003. These restrictions eliminate 310 of original 410 ﬁrms which appear
in the EMDB. Another 23 ﬁrms were eliminated because there were no earnings estimates available
for them. Two more ﬁrms, VSZ of Slovakia and Rolast of Romania, were dropped because of suspect
price data. Finally, one ﬁrm, Elektrim of Poland, was dropped because it ﬁled for bankruptcy in
September 2002. This leaves 74 ﬁrms. Table II shows the descriptive statistics of data for each
country as well as how the 74 ﬁrms are distributed across the 11 countries. Poland, Hungary,
Romania, the Czech Republic and Russia top the list with the largest number of ﬁrms.
The average percentage stock price increase during the integration window is shown in the third
column of Table II. It shows that stock prices went up substantially in the eight countries as well as
Romania, Russia and Croatia. The highest increase was in Slovenia, with stock prices rising 62%.
The lowest price increases occurred in Poland and Hungary. The fourth column shows the average
diﬀerence between the covariance of ﬁrm returns with local market returns and the covariance of
ﬁrm returns with world market returns. This is the empirical counterpart to DIFCOV discussed
in Section 2. The average DIFCOV is positive for all 11 countries. This is to be expected because
local ﬁrm returns are likely to co-move with local market returns more than with world market
returns. It indicates that the average ﬁrm’s systematic risk should have fallen upon integration. All
countries should experience a reduction in the cost of capital upon integration. The ﬁfth column
shows the diﬀerence between local and world beta – DIFBETA. Average DIFBETA is positive
for all but three countries. These three exceptions are Poland, Hungary and Russia. These countries
have relatively high variance of local market returns, which makes local betas small relative to world
betas. Local covariance is higher than the world covariance but not enough to oﬀset the diﬀerence
in the variance of local and world returns.
9When we allow the calculation of historical covariances and betas to use up to ﬁve years of historical data, the
results remain qualitatively the same.
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The data comes from the IBES which maintains a database of historical earnings forecasts not only
in the U.S., but also internationally. The unit of observation in the IBES data is month, ﬁrm and
forecast period. The forecast period is a ﬁscal year for which actual earnings are not yet available.
For example, in May 2002 the forecast period may be ﬁscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004. We limit the
forecast period to one, two or three ﬁscal years ahead.10 For each month, ﬁrm, and forecast period
we have three variables: the mean analyst forecast of earnings per share, the number of analysts
who revised their estimates up from the previous month, and the number of analysts who revised
their estimates down.
We measure the changes in earnings expectations as the number of analysts who increased their
earnings estimates minus the number of analysts who lowered their estimates. We call this measure
net upgrades. First, for each forecast period we subtract the number of analysts who lowered their
earnings estimate from the number of analysts who increased their estimates. Second, we average
across forecast periods. For example, in May 2002 we have earnings estimates for ﬁscal years 2002,
2003 and 2004. For each of these years we subtract the number of analysts who in May 2002 decreased
their forecasts from the number of analysts who increased their forecasts. Then we average those
diﬀerences to obtain net upgrades for May 2002. Net upgrades therefore capture the change in
analysts expectations of future earnings. If in May 2002 analysts become generally optimistic about
future earning of a company, the net upgrades will be high. Since this measure looks at the number
of analysts rather than revisions, it is robust to a few analysts posting large revisions. The sixth
column in Table II shows net upgrades for each country. In Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Russia
and Croatia more analysts lowered, rather than increased, their earnings estimates. In the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic countries, more analysts upped their estimates. On
average there were only 0.7 upward revisions for every downward revision. It is somewhat surprising
that analysts were not more optimistic during the period of dramatic stock price increases. This
suggests that the price increase is more likely due to a reduction in the discount rate rather than an
increase in expected dividends.
Table III shows descriptive statistics of each variable for the entire sample of ﬁrms. The average
share price went up 36% in the 15 months following the integration, ranging from a 46% decrease to
10We also eliminate interim forecasts, long-term growth forecasts and secondary forecasts, all of which are mostly
unavailable for the ﬁrms in the sample. The unavailability of long term growth forecasts means that part of the
economic impact of integration-which was likely to come only after actual accession-is excluded from our analysis.
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local and world beta is positive, but there a number of ﬁrms for which DIFBETA is negative. Net
upgrades range from -11 to 11. Following Chari and Henry, we construct a number of additional
control variables. Size is the ratio of a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization to average market
capitalization of the entire local market during the 12 months prior to the integration date. It
ranges from 0.1% to 82%. Turnover for each ﬁrm is the dollar value traded during the 12 months
prior to the liberalization date divided by the ﬁrm’s average market capitalization during the same
time period. It ranges from 0.5% to 24600%.
5 Estimation
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the relationship between the increase in stock prices following
the announcement of the enlargement and the two measures of changes in systematic risk: DIFCOV
and DIFBETA. We expect that the relationship to be positive for the EU accession countries and
insigniﬁcant for the non-accession countries. Therefore, we interact DIFCOV and DIFBETA with
an EU dummy variable which is one for the eight accession countries and zero for the three non-
accession countries. If EU enlargement is responsible for the integration, and the integration leads
to repricing of systematic risk, the coeﬃcient on this interaction should be positive and signiﬁcant.
5.1 Baseline regressions
Our baseline speciﬁcation results are shown in Table IV. The dependent variable in each speciﬁcation
is the percentage stock price increase from November 2001 until the February of 2003. Standard
errors in all regressions are estimated using heteroskedasticity robust formulas and assuming that ob-
servations are independent across countries but not within. Regressions in panel a include DIFCOV
as an explanatory variable, while regressions in panel b include DIFBETA instead. The ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcation includes the EU dummy, DIFCOV and the interaction between EU and DIFCOV .T h e
intercept is positive and highly signiﬁcant. It shows that ﬁrms with no change in systematic risk
could expect about a 56% increase in stock prices following the November 2001 announcement. This
means that stock prices went up even for stocks that experienced no reduction in the systematic
risk. The coeﬃcient on the EU dummy is insigniﬁcant indicating that controlling for DIFCOV ,
stock prices in the accession countries went up no more than in the non-accession countries.
The coeﬃcients on DIFCOV as well as the interaction of DIFCOV and EU are statistically
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measured by DIFCOV . This is true throughout, even when we control for expected earnings,
country ﬁxed eﬀects, size and turnover. It is evidence against the hypothesis that the dramatic rise
in stock prices was a result of repricing of systematic risk as measured by DIFCOV. The coeﬃcients
on net upgrades in speciﬁcations (2a) through (4a) are always positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
This is to be expected as it implies that higher expected earnings lead to higher stock prices. Net
upgrades are entered as a deviation from its overall mean so that the interpretation of the intercept
is the expected price change of a non-accession ﬁrm with no-change in systematic risk and average
net upgrade.
In columns (3a) and (4a) we include country ﬁxed eﬀects to allow intercepts to vary across
countries.11 In column (4a) we further control for size and turnover. Size is an important control
because it could be positively correlated with the change in systematic risk as well as the change in
prices. Large ﬁrms make up a large part of the local portfolio, and their returns are therefore likely
to move with the returns on the local portfolio. There is also evidence that foreign investors prefer
large ﬁrms (see, for example, Kang and Stulz (1999)). This could lead to a positive association
between changes in covariance and price increases which are driven by size rather than by re-pricing
of risk. This is supported by Christoﬀersen, Chung and Errunza (2002), who ﬁnd that following
capital market liberalization, large ﬁrms experience greater price increases relative to small ﬁrms.
Therefore, it is necessary to control for size in looking at the relationship between the change in
systematic risk and price increase. Following Christoﬀersen, Chung, Errunza (2002) and Chari and
Henry (2004), we also control for turnover. On the one hand, liquid ﬁrms may be more attractive
to foreign investors and thus experience large price increase. On the other hand, more liquid ﬁrms
may be less subject to price pressure and thus experience smaller price increases. Both size and
turnover are entered as deviations from their overall means so that the intercept can be interpreted
as the expected price change of a non-accession ﬁrm with no change in systematic risk, average
net upgrades, size and turnover. In all of the baseline speciﬁcations both size and turnover are
statistically insigniﬁcant. This means that controlling for DIFCOV large or more liquid ﬁrms
experience no greater increase in price than small and illiquid ones.
Panel b of table IV replaces DIFCOV with DIFBETAas an explanatory variable. Column (1b)
11The country ﬁxed eﬀects were restricted so that the intercepts and the EU dummy could be identiﬁed. Both the
intercept and the EU dummy are perfectly co-linear with country dummies. Therefore, we need two constraints. We
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in systematic risk, as measured by DIFBETA, experienced large price increases. The coeﬃcient on
the EU dummy is negative and signiﬁcant which indicates that controlling for DIFBETA,s t o c k
prices in accession went up less than in the non-accession countries. The coeﬃcient on DIFBETA
is statistically insigniﬁcant but the coeﬃcient on the interaction of DIFBETA and EU is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. This indicates that in the EU accession countries ﬁrms with high
local betas relative to world betas experienced higher price increases. The insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
on DIFBETA indicates that there is no such relationship in the non-accession countries. This is
consistent with the theory – repricing of systematic risk occurs in EU accession but not in other
countries. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between DIFBETA and EU remains signiﬁcant even
after we control for changes in expected earnings in column (2b), country eﬀects in column (3b)
and size and turnover in column (4b). Net upgrades are again signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all
speciﬁcations. Size and turnover are again insigniﬁcant.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the interaction between DIFBETA and EU ranges from
about 0.3 to 0.4. This means that when the diﬀerence in local and world beta is 0.24 (which is
the average value of DIFBETA), stock prices are expected to increase about 8% (0.35 · 0.24 =
0.08). Given that the average price increase is about 36%, we conclude that the diﬀerence in betas
explains, on average, about 22% of the price increase during the integration window. In summary,
DIFBETA has much more explanatory power than DIFCOV and the eﬀect of DIFBETA is
consistent with EU enlargement leading to market integration and repricing of systematic risk.
Furthermore, the eﬀect of DIFBETA in accession countries remains signiﬁcant after controlling for
changes in expected earnings and other controls. In the next section, we investigate whether the
signiﬁcance of DIFBETA is robust to outliers and changes in the integration window.
5.2 Robustness
We ﬁrst examine a number of scatter plots. While these show only bivariate relationships and do
not allow us to control for country or other eﬀects, they can identify outliers. Figure 1 shows the
scatter plot of the change in stock price against DIFCOV , DIFBETA and net upgrades. Each
of the three scatter plots is presented separately for the accession and non-accession countries. The
ﬁrst two scatter plots shows that the relationship between DIFCOV and the change in stock price
is weak for both accession and non-accession countries. The scatter plots of stock price change on
DIFBETA shows relatively strong positive relationship for accession countries. The relationship
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not driven by any outliers. Similarly, the positive relationship between price changes and the two
measures of the changes in expected earnings does not appear to be driven by outliers either and,
as expected, is positive for both accession and non-accession countries.
As a second robustness check, we estimate speciﬁcation (4b) from Table IV a number of times,
each time varying the integration date or the length of the integration window. Since integration is
a gradual progress, a slight modiﬁcation in the integration date should not make a large diﬀerence
in the results. In the ﬁrst two columns of Table V we shift the integration window one month
ahead and one month back, i.e. consider the integration window to be in turn from October 2001
to January 2003 and from December 2001 to March 2003 instead of the baseline November 2001 to
February 2003. This does not change the results: DIFBETA remains statistically signiﬁcant for
the accession countries.
We also check if DIFBETA is signiﬁcant when it should not be. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the
same regression as in (4b) with November 2000 as the start of the integration window. This is
a full year before the enlargement announcement and prior to the beginning of the rise in stock
prices. Therefore, we would not expect the changes in stock prices to be related to the diﬀerence
between local and world beta. In contrast, the number of net upgrades should aﬀect stock prices no
matter what time period we look at. The estimation shows that DIFBETA is insigniﬁcant for both
the accession and non-accession countries, while the number of net upgrades remains signiﬁcant.12
These results give us some conﬁdence that the signiﬁcance of DIFBETA in explaining changes in
stock prices is due to capital market integration rather than anything else.
In the last two columns of Table V we again consider November 2001 as the start of the integration
window, but change the length of the integration window. When we reduce the length from 16 (as
in table IV) to 10, i.e. from November 2001 to August 2002, DIFBETA is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Net upgrades are positive but marginally insigniﬁcant. When the integration
window is reduced to only 4 months, DIFBETA is no longer signiﬁcant. This is consistent with
integration taking place over longer periods of time. If integration were to happen instantaneously
we would observe a one time jump in the stock prices. This did not happen. Instead, in Figure 1 we
see a gradual and continuing increase since November 2001. Therefore, we would expect that the
diﬀerence in local and world betas would explain price changes only over a longer horizon. This is
12Using this window, there is only one non-accession country (Russia) with valid data. Therefore, with country
ﬁxed eﬀects the EU dummy is no longer identiﬁed.
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or two months and still ﬁnd changes in systematic risk signiﬁcant in explaining stock price changes.
However, this diﬀerence in results appears consistent with the type of market integration we consider
here – a gradual increase of integration in accession countries – as opposed to the removal of legal
barriers in stock markets in Latin America and Asia considered by Chari and Henry.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we consider if the results are driven by high beta stocks doing well
in an upmarket. We regressed price changes on local market beta and the interaction between the
local beta and the EU dummy. The results appear in table VI. The coeﬃcients on both local beta
and on the interaction with the EU dummy are insigniﬁcant. Net upgrades are again signiﬁcant.
Therefore, it appears that our results are driven by the changes in systematic risk rather than high
and low beta stocks behaving diﬀerently in an upmarket: what matters is DIFBETA,n o tb e t a .
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines the hypothesis that the dramatic increase in stock prices in EU accession
countries following the announcement of EU enlargement was a result of market integration and
the subsequent re-pricing of systematic risk. We test two versions of this hypothesis: one in which
integration is associated with a change in the market premium, and one in which the market premium
is constant. In the ﬁrst version, the change in systematic risk is measured by the diﬀerence between
the covariance of returns with the local market and the covariance of returns with the world market.
The diﬀerences in local and world covariances do not appear to be related to the changes in stock
prices. In the second version, the change in systematic risk is measured by the diﬀerence between
local and world betas. The evidence suggests that at least part of the stock price increase can be
explained by the diﬀerence between stocks’ local and world betas. Stocks that had high local beta
but a low world beta experienced a higher price increase than other stocks. We also test whether
the dramatic rise in stock prices is a reﬂection of an increase in expected earnings. We ﬁnd that
changes in expected earnings are consistently related to changes in stock prices. An upward revision
of expected earnings has a positive impact on a ﬁrm’s stock price.
Our ﬁnding that a measure of the change in systematic risk explains changes in stock prices is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Henry and Chari (2004). Changes in systematic risk are followed
by proportional changes in stock prices. Unlike Chari and Henry (2004), however, we do not ﬁnd
that the diﬀerence in covariances matters, but we do ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in betas are important
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of the market premium using historical variances. Since Central and Eastern European markets
have limited historical data, investors may not use historical variances to estimate market premia.
Instead our results suggest that investors use CAPM mechanically, i.e. discounting future cash
ﬂows using local betas prior to the announcement of EU accession and using world betas after the
announcement.
We ﬁnd the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in local and world betas for explaining price changes
rather striking. This is because as an empirical question, the odds are stacked against ﬁnding this
eﬀect. First, we have only 74 observations and 12 explanatory variables (including country eﬀects),
which leaves few degrees of freedom to estimate the coeﬃcients with precision. Second, we rely on
betas calculated using historical data, implicitly assuming that investors consider historical betas
as an accurate guide to what betas will be in the future. Given that the countries are undergoing
dramatic changes, this may be a strong assumption. In some sense, increased integration itself could
bring a change in the structure of the economy and alter the pattern of co-movement of returns.
We rely on the assumption that the degree of co-movement of returns is determined in the product
markets and that product markets had been integrated well before capital market integration. Thus,
capital market integration is not expected to have an eﬀect on covariances or on betas. Finally,
estimating the repricing eﬀect is hard because there is considerable uncertainty about the timing of
stock market integration.
Our ﬁndings should give impetus to further integration. This is because capital market inte-
gration has the eﬀects predicted by the standard international asset pricing model. Following the
announcement of EU enlargement, investors did re-value ﬁrms according to their systematic risk.
The risk sharing capacity of Central and Eastern European ﬁrms is correctly priced, and therefore
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Figure 1. Stock Market Indices in Accession Countries. Total U.S. dollar return indices from the Emerging
Markets Database for each country are scaled to equal 100 in January 1999.
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Opening Dates and Legal Restrictions
The sources are Bekaert Harvey’s chronology of Economic, Political and Financial Events in Emerging Markets, and
Bank of New York list of depository receipts.
Stock Market Restrictions Start of EMDB First
Country Established Lifted Coverage ADR
Czech Republic June 1992 September 1994a January 1994 June 1995
Hungary July 1990 1996b December 1992 July 1992
Poland January 1991 February 1997 December 1992 February 1997
Slovenia December 1988 1999c January 1996 June 1997
Slovakia January 1994 April 1998d January 1996 April 1996
Estonia May 1996 1996e April 1998 December 1997
Lithuania January 1996 June 1999f January 1996 July 1996
Latvia January 1996 1996g December 1997 December 1997
Croatia 1991 1998h January 1998 April 1996
Romania 1995 NA January 1998 April 1998
Russia 1991 NA January 1996 December 1994
aMore restrictions lifted in 1999.
bMore restrictions lifted in 1998.
cUntil 1999 foreign sales within 7 years taxed 12%. 25% foreign ownership limit.
dMore controls lifted in 2000.
eMore liberalization in 2000. Restrictions on certain industries.
fForeign investment still restricted in certain industries.
gAll restrictions lifted in 1999.
hMore restrictions lifted in 2002.
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Means of Key Variables by Country
Price increase is the percentage stock price increase between November 2001 and February 2003. DIFCOV is
the covariance of ﬁrm returns with local market returns minus the covariance of ﬁrm returns with world returns.
DIFBETA is the diﬀerence between local market beta and world market beta. Both covariances and betas were
calculated using 36 months of historical returns from November 2001 and prior. Average Revision is the average
percentage change in mean expected earnings between November 2001 and February 2003. The number of net
upgrades is the average number of upward revisions minus the number of downward revisions between November 2001
and December 2002.
#o f %P r i c e N e t
Country Firms Increase DIFCOV DIFBETA Upgrades
Poland 15 0.16 0.0070 -0.19 -1.91
Hungary 10 0.11 0.0056 -0.24 -1.70
Czech Republic 8 0.43 0.0071 0.41 0.08
Slovenia 5 0.63 0.0023 0.59 -0.20
Slovakia 4 0.61 0.0035 0.59 0.00
Lithuania 4 0.39 0.0010 0.46 0.25
Latvia 4 0.28 0.0028 0.06 0.00
Estonia 5 0.46 0.0041 0.52 0.70
Romania 10 0.54 0.0074 1.43 0.07
Russia 7 0.37 0.0231 -0.86 -1.14
Croatia 2 0.55 0.0054 0.66 -0.83
Total 74 0.36 0.0071 0.24 -0.68
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Descriptive Statistics
Price increase is the percentage stock price increase between November 2001 and February 2003. DIFCOV is
the covariance of ﬁrm returns with local market returns minus the covariance of ﬁrm returns with world returns.
DIFBETA is the diﬀerence between local market beta and world market beta. Both covariances and betas were
calculated using 36 months of historical returns from November 2001 and prior. Average Revision is the average
percentage change in mean expected earnings between November 2001 and February 2003. The number of net
upgrades is the average number of upward revisions minus the number of downward revisions between November 2001
and February 2003. Size is a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization as a percentage of average total domestic market
capitalization during the 12 months prior to November 2001. Turnover is the dollar value traded during the 12 months
prior to the liberalization date as percentage of a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization.
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Price Change 0.356 0.413 -0.462 1.085 0.366
DIFCOV 0.007 0.006 -0.001 0.030 0.006
DIFBETA 0.237 0.234 -1.404 2.091 0.761
Net Upgrades -0.682 0.000 -11.000 10.667 3.233
Size 0.111 0.047 0.001 0.824 0.152
Turnover 37.414 3.258 0.005 246.225 65.632
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Varying Integration Date and Window
The dependent variable is the percentage stock price increase during the integration window. DIFBETA is the
diﬀerence between local market beta and world market beta. Both covariances and betas were calculated using
months of historical returns from the beginning of the integration window and prior. EU is a dummy variable equal
to one for the eight accession countries. The number of net upgrades is the average number of upward revisions
minus number of downward revisions during the integration window. Size is a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization
as a percentage of average total domestic market capitalization during the 12 months prior to the beginning of
the integration window. Turnover is the dollar value traded during the 12 months prior to the beginning of the
integration window as percentage of a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization. Net Upgrades, Size and Turnover are
entered as deviations from their overall means. The country eﬀects are constrained so that they sum to zero for
accession countries and so that they sum to zero for non-accession countries. T-statistics calculated using robust and
country “clustered” standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 5 and 1 %.
Integration Date Oct. ‘01 Dec. ‘01 Nov. ‘00 Nov. ‘01 Nov. ‘01
Window Length 16 16 16 10 4
Intercept 0.716** 0.639** 0.128 0.481** 0.230**
(6.58) (6.28) (0.83) (5.58) (3.37)
EU -0.213 -0.207 -0.211 -0.126
(-1.60) (-0.54) (-1.08) (-0.96)
DIFBETA -0.165 -0.172 -0.166 -0.122 -0.033
(-1.09) (-1.32) (-1.23) (-1.02) (-0.34)
DIFBETA∗ EU 0.418* 0.468** 0.066 0.317* 0.018
(2.35) (2.81) (0.38) (2.15) (0.17)
Net Upgrades 0.017 0.034** 0.022** 0.015 0.031*
(1.48) (3.51) (3.95) (1.51) (2.47)
Size 0.019 -0.009 0.282 0.193 0.174
(0.10) (-0.05) (0.67) (1.14) (1.41)
Turnover -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.002 0.000
(-0.86) (-2.27) (-2.34) (-2.16) (1.43)
Country Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.287 0.453 0.391 0.291 0.207
Number of Obs. 69 72 65 84 84
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Price Changes and Beta
The dependent variable is the percentage stock price increase during the integration window. BETAM is the local
market beta calculated using 36 months of historical returns from the beginning of the integration window and prior.
EU is a dummy variable equal to one for the eight accession countries. The number of net upgrades is the average
number of upward revisions minus number of downward revisions during the integration window. Size is a ﬁrm’s
average market capitalization as a percentage of average total domestic market capitalization during the 12 months
prior to the beginning of the integration window. Turnover is the dollar value traded during the 12 months prior to
the beginning of the integration window as percentage of a ﬁrm’s average market capitalization. Net Upgrades, Size
and Turnover are entered as deviations from their overall means. The country eﬀects are constrained so that they
sum to zero for accession countries and so that they sum to zero for non-accession countries. T-statistics calculated
using robust and country “clustered” standard errors are in parentheses. A * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 5 and 1
%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.444 0.503 0.591** 0.504**
(1.65) (1.98) (3.01) (3.19)
EU 0.046 -0.005 -0.249 0.305
(0.16) (-0.02) (-1.26) (1.75)
BETAM 0.033 -0.004 -0.014 0.073
(0.17) (-0.02) (-0.06) (0.40)
BETAM ∗ EU -0.269 -0.202 -0.252 -0.395
(-1.09) (-0.88) (-1.02) (-1.81)






Country Eﬀects no no yes yes
R2 0.075 0.198 0.351 0.364
Number of Obs. 74 74 74 74
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